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Abstract: 
We consider a multi-period rational expectations model in which risk-averse investors differ 
in their information on past transaction prices (the ticker). Some investors (insiders) observe 
prices in real-time whereas other investors (outsiders) observe prices with a delay. As prices 
are informative about the asset payoff, insiders get a strictly larger expected utility than 
outsiders. Yet, information acquisition by one investor exerts a negative externality on other 
investors. Thus, investors’ average welfare is maximal when access to price information is 
rationed. We show that a market for price information can implement the fraction of insiders 
that maximizes investors’ average welfare. This market features a high price to curb excessive 
acquisition of ticker information. We also show that informational efficiency is greater when 
the dissemination of ticker information is broader and more timely. 
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 1 Introduction
Real-time information on transaction prices and quotes is not free in ﬁnancial markets,
and the market for price information is a signiﬁcant source of revenues to exchanges.1
For instance, in 2003, the sale of market data generated a revenue of $386 million
for U.S. equity markets for a cost of dissemination estimated at $38 million.2 This
situation is controversial and market participants often complain that the price of
information is too high. NYSE’s recent proposal to charge a fee for the dissemination
of real-time information on quotes and trades in Archipelago (a trading platform
acquired by the NYSE in 2006), triggered a strong opposition. Similarly, data fees
charged by Nasdaq for the dissemination of prices in the U.S. corporate bond market
have been the subject of heated debates.3
These debates raise intriguing economic questions. How does the dissemination of
price information a ect the allocative and informational e ciency of ﬁnancial mar-
kets? Should market data be widely disseminated or can it be e cient to restrict
access to real-time information? What is the role of markets for price information?
Can it be socially optimal to curb acquisition of market data by charging a high fee
for price information?
We study these questions in a multi-period rational expectations model. The
model considers the market for a risky security with risk averse investors who possess
heterogeneous signals about the payo  of the security. Investors trade to share the
risk associated with their initial holdings of the security, and to speculate on their
private information. Some investors – the“insiders”– observe the entire history of
prices (the “real-time ticker”) when they arrive in the market. Other investors – the
“outsiders”– observe past prices with a delay (latency).
1Information on past trades is generally available for free only after some delay (e.g., twenty
minutes on the NYSE, ﬁfteen minutes on Nasdaq and Euronext). See http://finance.yahoo.com/
exchanges, for the delays after which information on transaction prices from major stock exchanges
is freely released on yahoo.com. Brokers may sometimes give price information for free to their
clients. However, they pay a fee to data vendors for this information and presumably pass this cost
to their clients by adjusting their brokerage fee.
2See Exchange Act Rel N 49,325 -February, 26, 2004 available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/
proposed/34-49325.htm. The sale of market data is important for European exchanges as well.
For instance, in 2005, the sale of market information accounted for 33% (resp. 10%) of the London
Stock Exchange (resp. Euronext) annual revenues. Source: Annual Reports.
3For accounts of these debates, see, for instance, “Latest Market Data Dispute Over NYSE’s Plan
to Charge for Depth-of-Book Data Pits NSX Against Other U.S. Exchanges,” Wall Street Technology,
May 21, 2007; the letter to the SEC of the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association
(SIFMA) available at http://www.sifma.org/regulatory/comment_letters/41907041.pdf, and
“TRACE Market Data Fees go to SEC,” Securities Industry News, 6/3/2002.
2As transaction prices are informative about the asset payo , insiders have an
informational advantage over outsiders, and thus enjoy a higher expected utility. We
call the value of the ticker the maximum fee that, other things equal, an investor is
willing to pay to be an insider. This value depends both on the scope and timeliness
of information dissemination. Indeed, insiders’ demand depends on their privileged
price information, which therefore transpires into clearing prices. Hence, outsiders
can partially catch up with insiders’ information by conditioning their demands on the
clearing price when they trade.4 Now, the informativeness of the clearing price about
the information contained in past prices increases with the proportion of insiders and
decreases with latency. Accordingly, the value of the ticker is inversely related to the
proportion of insiders and positively related to latency.
We show that there is a conﬂict between the private and social value of the ticker.
Individually, each investor has an incentive to acquire ticker information. However,
acquisition of ticker information by one investor exerts a negative externality on
all other investors. Indeed, as investors become better informed, their demand is
more elastic to the di erence between their pay-o  forecast and the clearing price.
This e ect brings prices closer to the asset payo , reducing the speculative gains that
investors derive from market participation. Hedging gains are reduced as well because
earlier resolution of uncertainty reduces the scope for risk sharing among investors.5
Thus, a too broad dissemination of ticker information can be detrimental to al-
locative e ciency. In fact, in the model, investors are strictly worse o  when ticker
information is freely available compared to the situation in which no investor observes
ticker information. Yet, completely shutting down the access to ticker information
leaves “money on the table” since each investor individually beneﬁts from observing
past prices. In fact, in our model, investors’ average welfare (i.e., the equally weighted
sum of investors’ expected utilities) is in general not maximal when the market is fully
opaque. Rather, a two-tier market, featuring both insiders and outsiders, maximizes
investors’ average welfare.
The socially optimal market structure can be achieved by granting privileged
access to ticker information only to a limited number of investors. In today’s markets,
4This feature distinguishes our approach from Hellwig (1982). Hellwig (1982) considers a multi-
period rational expectations model in which some investors form their beliefs about the asset payo 
by using the information contained in past prices only.
5This is a manifestation of the so called Hirshleifer e ect. See, Dow and Rahi (2003) or Medrano
and Vives (2004) for an application to models of trading with asymmetric information.
3however, exchanges cannot decide who has access to price information.6 Instead, they
can sell this information. We show that the creation of a market for price information
can be a way to achieve the socially optimal ticker information dissemination. Indeed,
an exchange can control the proportion of investors buying real-time information via
the fee it charges (the larger the fee, the smaller the proportion of investors buying
information). We ﬁrst consider the case in which an exchange is not-for proﬁt and
redistributes the proceeds from information sales among all investors. In this case,
the exchange policy maximizes social welfare and is fair, in the sense that outsiders
and insiders obtain the same expected utility (net of their transfers to the exchange).
We then consider the more realistic case of a for-proﬁt, monopolist exchange,
which derives revenues from (i) the sale of ticker information and (ii) the sale of
trading rights. The exchange ﬁnds it optimal to restrict access to ticker information
because investors’ willingness to pay for both the ticker and trading rights decreases
with the proportion of insiders. Moreover, with its tari , the for-proﬁt exchange
extracts all the gains from trade from investors. Hence, it also chooses a pricing policy
that maximizes investors’ average welfare (gross of their payments to the exchange).
Finally, we analyze how the dissemination of ticker information a ects the infor-
mational content of prices. We ﬁnd that a broader and more timely dissemination of
price information is associated with more informative prices. In particular, a reduc-
tion in latency increases the amount of information available to outsiders and thereby
their risk bearing capacity. As a consequence, the equilibrium risk premium is in-
versely related to latency for each realization of the asset supply. This ﬁnding suggests
that a reduction in latency should result in a price run-up (smaller risk premia), as
found empirically in Easley, Hendershott and Ramadorai (2007).
Our analysis contributes to the literature on ﬁnancial markets transparency (see,
e.g., Biais (1993), Madhavan (1995), Pagano and Ro¨ ell (1996)). An important dif-
ference with this literature is our focus on investors’ welfare and the idea that trans-
parency can be excessive from a social standpoint. Our approach also builds upon
the literature on markets for ﬁnancial information (e.g., Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1986,
1987, 1990), Fishman and Hagerthy (1995), Cespa (2007)). This literature focuses on
the sale of exogenous signals on securities payo s. As prices aggregate information,
they also constitute payo -relevant signals. However, their precision is endogenous
as it depends on investors’ demands and market organization. That is, this precision
6In the U.S., stock exchanges must make their data available since 1975 according to the so
called “Quote Rule.” Yet, they can charge a price for disseminating their market data.
4cannot be directly controlled by the information seller. Moreover, access to price
information can be delayed, a feature that has not been considered in the literature
on information sales. Last, price information is usually sold by exchanges (directly
or through data vendors).7 Exchanges also derive revenues from trading. Thus, they
are not pure information sellers and they care about the e ect of disseminating price
information on market participation. For all these reasons, markets for price infor-
mation deserve a speciﬁc analysis.
Research on this topic is surprisingly scarce given the importance of prices as a
conduit for information in economics. Mulherin et al. (1992) o er an historical account
of how exchanges established their property rights over market data.8 Boulatov and
Dierker (2007) in a paper that is more related to ours, formally analyze the sale of price
information. In their model, however, traders cannot condition their demand on the
contemporaneous clearing price. Hence, they seek price information to reduce their
uncertainty on execution prices (“execution risk”). In the present article, execution
risk is not a concern since traders submit price contingent orders. Rather, price
information is valuable because past prices are informative about the asset payo .
Moreover, di erently from Boulatov and Dierker (2007), our main focus is on the
welfare e ects of price information dissemination. The presence of noise traders with
exogenous demands precludes a welfare analysis in Boulatov and Dierker (2007).
The paper is organized as follows. We describe the model in Section 2. In Section
3, we derive the equilibrium of the model. Section 4 analyzes the e ects of a change
in the proportion of insiders and latency on price discovery. Section 5 analyzes how
investors’ welfare depends on the distribution of price information among investors
and introduces a market for price information in the model. Section 6 summarizes
the main ﬁndings of the article. We collect proofs that are not in the text in the
Appendix.
2 Model
We consider the market for a risky asset with payo  v   N(0,  1
v ). Trades in this
market take place at dates 1,2,...,N. At date N + 1, the asset payo  is realized.
In each period, a continuum of investors (indexed by i   [0,1]) arrives in the market.
7See Lee (2000), Chapter 6, for a detailed description of the market for price information and
pricing policies followed by exchanges. For a description of this market in the U.S., see “Report of
the advisory committee on market information: a blueprint for responsible change,” SEC, 2001.
8See also Pirrong (2002) for related research.
5They invest in the risky security and in a riskless security with a zero return and then
leave the market. As investors stay in the market for only one period, they are not
informed about the terms of past transactions when they enter the market. For this
reason, they have a motive for buying information on past transaction prices.
As in Hellwig (1980) or Verrechia (1982), an investor arriving at date n is endowed
with ein shares of the risky security and a private signal sin about the payo  of the
security. We assume that
ein = en +  in, (1)
and
sin = v +  in, (2)
where  in   N(0,  1
 n),  in   N(0,  1
 n ) and en   N(0,  1
e ). Investors in a given
period have private signals of equal precision but this precision can vary across peri-
ods. We say that “fresh” information is available at date n if investors entering the
market at this date have private information (that is, if   n > 0). Error terms (the
 s  and  s ) are independent across agents, across periods, and from v and en. The
ens  are i.i.d. and independent from the asset payo , v. We also assume that error
terms across agents cancel out (i.e.,
  1
0 sindi = v, and
  1
0 eindi = en, a.s.). Thus, the
aggregate (per capita) endowment in period n is en.
We denote by pn the clearing price at date n and by pn the record of all transaction
prices up to date n (the “ticker”):
p
n = {pt}
n
t=0, with p0 = E[v] = 0. (3)
Investors di er in their access to ticker information. Investors with type I (the in-
siders) observe the ticker in real-time while investors with type O (the outsiders)
observe the ticker with a lag equal to l   2 periods. That is, insiders arriving at
date n observe pn 1 before submitting their orders and outsiders arriving at date n
observe pn l  where l  = min{n,l}:
p
n l 
=
 
{p1,p2,...,pn l}, if n > l,
p0, if n   l. (4)
We refer to pn as the “real-time ticker” and to pn l  as the “lagged ticker.” The
“delayed ticker” is the set of prices unobserved by outsiders (i.e., pn   pn l ). The
fraction of insiders is denoted by µ. In the ﬁrst period, the distinction between insiders
and outsiders is moot since there are no prior transactions (and hence no past prices
6to observe). This period can be seen as the ﬁrst trading round following the overnight
closure in real markets. Figure 1 below describes the timing of the model.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Each investor has a CARA utility function with risk tolerance  . Thus, if investor
i holds xin shares of the risky security at date n, her expected utility is
E[U( in)|sin,ein, 
k
n] = E[ exp{  
 1 in}|sin,ein, 
k
n], (5)
where  in = (v   pn)xin + pnein and  k
n is the price information available at date
n to an investor with type k   {I,O}. In period n, insiders and outsiders submit
orders contingent on the price at date n (limit orders). The clearing price in each
period aggregates investors’ private signals and provides an additional signal about
the asset payo . As investors submit price contingent demand functions, they can all
act as if they were observing the contemporaneous clearing price and account for the
information contained in this price. Thus, in period n   2, we have  I
n = {pn} and
 O
n = {pn l ,pn}. We denote the demand function of an insider by xI
n(sin,ein,pn)
and that of an outsider by xO
n(sin,ein,pn l ,pn). In each period, the clearing price,
pn, is such that the demand for the security is equal to its supply, i.e.,
  µ
0
x
I
n(sin,ein,p
n)di +
  1
µ
x
O
n(sin,ein,p
n l 
,pn)di = en,  n. (6)
Parameters µ and l control the level of market transparency. When the proportion
of insiders increases, the market is more transparent as more investors observe the
ticker in real-time. When l becomes smaller, market transparency increases since
outsiders observe past transaction prices more quickly. We refer to l as the latency
in information dissemination and to µ as the scope in information dissemination.
3 Equilibrium prices with heterogeneous ticker in-
formation
In this section, we study the equilibrium of the security market in each period. We
focus on rational expectations equilibria in which investors’ demand functions are
linear in their private signals and prices. In this case, the clearing price in equilibrium
is itself a linear function of the asset payo  and the aggregate endowment. We refer to
 n(µ,l)
def
= (Var[v|pn]) 1 as the informativeness of the real-time ticker at date n and
7to ˆ  n(µ,l)
def
= (Var[v|pn l ,pn]) 1 – the precision of outsiders’ forecast conditional on
their price observations at date n – as the informativeness of the “truncated” ticker.
The next lemma provides a characterization of the unique linear rational expectations
equilibrium in each period.
Lemma 1 In any period n, there is a unique linear rational expectations equilibrium.
In this equilibrium, the price is given by
pn = Anv  
l  1  
j=0
Bn,jen j + DnE[v | p
n l 
], (7)
where An,{Bn,j}
l  1
j=0 ,Dn are positive constants characterized in the proof of the
lemma. Moreover, investors’ demand functions are given by
x
I
n(sin,ein,p
n) =  ( n +   n)(E[v|sin,ein,p
n]   pn), (8)
x
O
n(sin,ein,p
n l 
,pn) =  (ˆ  n +   n)(E[v|sin,ein,p
n l 
,pn]   pn), (9)
where  n +   n   Var[v|pn,sin] 1, and ˆ  n +   n   Var[v|pn,pn l sin] 1.
An investor’s demand is proportional to the di erence between her forecast of
the asset payo  and the clearing price, scaled by the precision of her forecast (e.g.,
 n +   n for an insider). As shown below, an insider holds a more precise forecast
of the asset pay-o  compared to an outsider. Hence, her demand is more elastic to
di erence between her forecast and the clearing price, and, other things equal, her
position in the risky asset is larger.
To interpret the expression for the equilibrium price, we focus on the case in which
l = 2 (the same interpretation applies for l > 2). In this case, equation (7) becomes
pn = Anv   Bn,0en   Bn,1en 1 + DnE[v | p
n 2], for n   2. (10)
To gain more intuition, we now consider some particular cases. For the discussion,
we deﬁne zn
def
= anv   en, and an
def
=    n.
Case 1. No fresh information is available at date n   1 and at date n (for n   3).
In this case, An = 0, Bn,0 = (  n 2) 1, Bn,1 = 0, and Dn = 1 (see the expressions for
these coe cients in the appendix). Thus, the equilibrium price at date n is
pn = E[v | p
n 2]   (  n 2)
 1en. (11)
8As investors entering the market at dates n and n   1 do not possess fresh informa-
tion, the clearing price at date n cannot reﬂect information above and beyond that
contained in the lagged ticker, pn 2. Thus, the clearing price is equal to the expected
value of the security conditional on the lagged ticker adjusted by a risk premium. The
size of the risk premium is smaller when investors are more risk tolerant (  large) or
when the uncertainty on the asset payo  is smaller ( n 2 large).  
Case 2. Fresh information is available at date n   1 but not at date n (  n = 0 but
  n 1 > 0). In this case, the transaction price at date n 1 contains new information
on the asset payo  (An 1  = 0). Speciﬁcally, we show in the proof of Lemma 1 that
the observation of the price at date n   1 conveys a signal zn 1 = an 1v   en 1 on
the asset payo . Moreover, the equilibrium price at date n can be written as follows
pn = E[v | p
n 2] + Ana
 1
n 1
 
zn 1   E
 
zn 1 | p
n 2  
  Bn,0en. (12)
If µ = 0, we have An = 0 and the expression for the equilibrium price at date n is
identical to the expression derived in Case 1 (equation (11)). Indeed, in this case, no
investor observes the last transaction price. Thus, the information contained in this
price (zn 1) cannot transpire into the price at date n.
In contrast, if µ > 0 some investors at date n observe the last transaction price
and trade on the information it contains. Thus, this information “percolates” into
the price at date n and the latter is informative (An > 0), even though there is no
fresh information at date n. Speciﬁcally, equation (12) shows that an outsider can
extract a signal ˆ zn, from the clearing price at date n:
ˆ zn =  1zn 1    0en =  1zn 1 +  0zn, (13)
with  0
def
= A 1
n Bn,0 and  1
def
= a
 1
n 1. This signal does not perfectly reveal insiders’
information (zn 1) as it also depends on the supply of the risky security at date n
(en). Thus, at date n, outsiders obtain information (ˆ zn) from the clearing price but
this information is not as precise as insiders’ information. For this reason, being an
insider is valuable in our set-up.  
Case 3. Fresh information is available at date n and date n   1 but µ = 0. In this
case, the price at date n aggregates investors’ private signals at this date and for this
reason An > 0. On the other hand, no investor observes the price realized at date
n   1. Hence Bn,1 = 0. Thus, the equilibrium price at date n can be written as
follows:
pn = E
 
v | p
n 2 
+ Ana
 1
n
 
zn   E
 
zn | p
n 2  
. (14)
9In this case, all investors obtain the same signal, zn, from the price at date n. Thus,
investors’ estimates of the asset payo  have identical precision. Together, Cases 2
and 3 show that insiders’ informational edge exclusively comes from their ability to
observe transaction prices more quickly than outsiders.  
In the rest of the paper, we shall assume that fresh information is available at
all dates (  n > 0, n). This assumption simpliﬁes the presentation of some results
without a ecting the ﬁndings. In this case, the price at date n contains information on
the asset payo  (i.e., An > 0) because (a) investors’ demand depends on their private
signals (as in Case 3), and (b) insiders’ demand depends on the signals {zn j}
j=l  1
j=1
that they extract from the prices yet unobserved by outsiders at date n (as in Case
2). We show in the proof of Lemma 1 that outsiders extract from the clearing price
a signal:
ˆ zn =
l  1  
j=0
 jzn j = v  
l  1  
j=0
Bn,j
An
en j, (15)
where the  s  are positive coe cients. As shown below (Proposition 1), this signal
provides a less precise estimate of the asset payo  than the signals {zn j}
j=l  1
j=1 ob-
tained from the delayed ticker by insiders. In other words, the current clearing price
is not a su cient statistic for the entire price history. Thus, observing past prices
has value even though investors can condition their demand on the contemporaneous
clearing price.9 We analyze the determinants of this value in Section 5.2 below.
4 Price discovery and risk premium with hetero-
geneous ticker information
We now study how the scope in information dissemination (µ) and latency (l) a ect
the informativeness of the price history. We use two measures of price informativeness:
(i) ˆ  n(µ,l) = (Var[v|pn l ,pn]) 1, the informativeness of the “truncated ticker” and
(ii)  n(µ,l) = (Var[v|pn]) 1, the informativeness of the real-time ticker. The ﬁrst
(resp. second) measure takes the point of view of outsiders (resp. insiders) since it
measures the residual uncertainty on the asset payo  conditional on the prices that
outsiders (resp. insiders) observe.
9Other authors (Brown and Jennings (1989) and Grundy and McNichols (1989)) have considered
multi-period rational expectations models in which clearing prices are not a su cient statistic for
past prices. In contrast, Brennan and Cao (1996) and Vives (1995) develop multi-period models in
which the clearing price in each period is a su cient statistic for the entire price history.
10Let  m
n (µ,l)
def
= (Var[ˆ zn|v]) 1. The next proposition shows that  m
n is the contribu-
tion of the nth clearing price to the informativeness of the truncated ticker. For this
reason, we refer to  m
n as the informativeness of the nth clearing price for outsiders.10
Proposition 1 At any date n   2:
1. The informativeness of the real-time ticker,  n, is independent of latency and
the scope in information dissemination. It is given by
 n(µ,l) =  v +  e
n  
t=1
a
2
t, with at =    t. (16)
2. The informativeness of the truncated ticker, ˆ  n, is given by
ˆ  n(µ,l) =  n l  +  
m
n (µ,l). (17)
It increases in the scope of information dissemination and (weakly) decreases
with latency. Moreover, it is strictly smaller than the informativeness of the
real-time ticker (i.e., ˆ  n <  n).
In equilibrium, an investor’s demand can be written as
x
k
n(sin,ein, 
k
n) = (   n)sin    
k
n( 
k
n), (18)
where  k
n is a linear function of the prices observed by an investor with type k  
{I,O}. Thus, the sensitivity of investors’ demand to their private signals (   n) is
identical for outsiders and insiders. Accordingly, the sensitivity of the nth clearing
price to the fresh information available in this period (i.e.,
  1
0 sindi) does not depend
on the proportion of insiders. For this reason, the informativeness of the entire price
history does not depend on the proportion of insiders (ﬁrst part of the proposition).
Yet, the informativeness of a truncated record of prices, {pn,pn l }, increases with
the fraction of insiders (second part of the proposition). The explanation for these
seemingly incompatible ﬁndings is as follows.
As explained in the previous section, the nth clearing price is informative about
the signals {zn j}
l  1
j=1 obtained by insiders from the delayed ticker (the prices yet
unobserved by outsiders). This information is useless for an insider, as he directly
10Strictly speaking, this is the informativeness of the nth clearing price from the point of view of
outsiders after accounting for the information contained in the lagged ticker.
11observes the zs , but not for an outsider. For this reason, the precision of an outsider’s
forecast at date n is larger than if he could not condition his forecast on the contem-
poraneous clearing price (ˆ  n >  n l ). Yet, insiders’ forecast is more precise than
outsiders’ (ˆ  n <  n) because the clearing price at date n is not a su cient statistic
for the delayed ticker
As the proportion of insiders increases, the price at date n aggregates better
insiders’ information on the delayed ticker. For this reason, the informativeness of
the truncated ticker increases in µ. In contrast, as latency increases, it becomes more
di cult for outsiders to extract information on the signals obtained by insiders from
the delayed ticker (since the number of price signals possessed by insiders increases).
Thus,  m
n (µ,l) decreases with l (for n > l).11 Moreover, an increase in latency implies
that outsiders have access to a shorter and, therefore less informative, price history.
Hence, the informativeness of the truncated ticker decreases with latency.
The mean squared deviation between the payo  of the security and the clearing
price (the average “pricing error” at date n) is a measure the quality of price discovery.
Using the law of iterated expectations and the fact that E[v] = 0, it is immediate
from equation (7) that
E[v   pn] = 0.
Thus, the average pricing error at date n is equal to Var[v   pn].12
Proposition 2 At any date n   2, the average pricing error (Var[v  pn]), decreases
with the proportion of insiders.
The intuition for this result is as follows. As insiders have a more precise estimate
of the asset payo , they bear less risk. Consequently, their demand is more responsive
than outsiders’ demand to deviations between the estimate of the fundamental value
and the current clearing price (the “perceived risk premium”). Indeed,
 xI
in
 (E[v|sin,ein,pn]   pn)
=  ( n+  n) >
 xO
in
 (E[v|sin,ein,pn l ,pn]   pn)
=  (ˆ  n+  n).
Thus, an increase in the proportion of insiders widens the proportion of investors with
a relatively high elasticity of demand to the perceived risk premium. Simultaneously,
11When n < l,    n(µ,l) does not depend on l. In particular, an increase in l in this case leaves
unchanged the number of prices unobserved by an outsider, that is, the number of signals possessed
by insiders that outsiders attempt to recover from the observation of the nth clearing price. Thus,
for n < l,  m
n (µ,l) does not depend on l.
12It is also the case that E[v   pn] = 0 if E[v]  = 0 because An + Dn = 1.
12it increases the precision of outsiders’ estimate at date n, ˆ  n. These two e ects com-
bine to make investors’ aggregate demand more elastic to the perceived risk premium.
As a consequence, the absolute di erence between the clearing price and the payo 
of the security narrows when there are more insiders.
We have not been able to study analytically the e ect of an increase in latency
on the average pricing error. However, extensive numerical simulations indicate that
an increase in latency has a positive impact on the average pricing error at each date
n   2, as illustrated in Figure 2 (compare for instance the pricing error when n = 15
for l = 10 and l = 20).
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
In each trading round, investors receive new information which is then reﬂected
into subsequent prices through trades by insiders and outsiders. For this reason,
the pricing error decreases over time (i.e., n). Interestingly, Figure 2 shows that
the speed at which the pricing error decays with n increases sharply when outsiders
start obtaining information on past prices, that is, when l < n . Intuitively, in this
case, the information contained in past prices is better reﬂected into current prices
because all investors (insiders plus outsiders) trade on this information. This e ect
dramatically accelerates the speed of learning about the asset payo  compared to
the case in which outsiders trade in the “dark” (n   l). This observation suggests
that the time at which ticker information becomes available for free in the trading
day should coincide with a discontinuity in the speed of price discovery in ﬁnancial
markets.
Interestingly, changes in latency also a ect the price level of the security. To see
this, let Rn(en)
def
= E[(v   pn)I(en) | en] be the average risk premium at date n when
the net supply is en. Variable I(en) is an indicator variable equal to +1 when en   0
and  1 when en < 0. This deﬁnition guarantees that the average risk premium is
positive even when en is negative (in which case investors have a short position in
the aggregate). Using Lemma 1 and the law of iterated expectations, it is immediate
that:
Rn(en) = E[v   pn | en] = Bn,0(l)I(en)en. (19)
where Bn,0(l) is the value of coe cient Bn,0 when latency is l. We obtain the following
result.
13Proposition 3 For each realization of the asset supply at date n, the average risk
premium weakly increases with the latency in information dissemination, l.
An increase in latency reduces the precision of the outsiders’ asset payo  forecast.
As a consequence, outsiders require a larger compensation to hold a given position
(long or short) in the risky security, implying that the average risk premium increases
in latency. In other words, a reduction in latency should be associated with an in-
crease in stock prices, other things equal. This prediction is consistent with empirical
ﬁndings in Easley et al. (2007).
To sum up, we ﬁnd that restricting the dissemination of ticker information impairs
price discovery.13 Indeed, an increase in the proportion of insiders improves the
informativeness of the truncated ticker and reduces the dispersion of pricing errors.
Moreover, an increase in latency reduces the informativeness of the truncated ticker.
For this reason, an increase in latency decreases the risk bearing capacity of the
market, and increases the equilibrium risk premium.
5 Dissemination of the ticker and welfare
5.1 The ticker externality
We now consider the e ect of broadening the dissemination of ticker information on
investors’ welfare. As in Dow and Rahi (2003), we measure investors’ welfare by
the certainty equivalent of their ex-ante expected utility (i.e., before they learn their
signals and their endowment).14 At date n, the certainty equivalent is the maximal
fee that an investor would be willing to pay to enter the market. We denote it by
Ck
n(µ,l) for an investor with type k and call it the investor’s payo .
13This possibility is often discussed in regulatory controversies about the pricing of market data.
For instance, see the letter to the SEC of the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association
(SIFMA) available at http://www.sifma.org/regulatory/comment_letters/41907041.pdf
14The conclusions are identical if we work directly with investors’ expected utilities. Expressions
for the certainty equivalent are easier to interpret.
14When  2 e v > 1, we obtain the following expressions for investors’ payo s:
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The condition  2 e v > 1 guarantees that investors’ ex-ante expected utility is well
deﬁned.15 The derivation of these expressions requires tedious calculations but is
standard (see for instance Dow and Rahi (2003)). We thus omit these calculations
for brevity.16
An investor’s payo  is the sum of two components that we call respectively the
speculative component and the hedging component. These two components reﬂect
the two beneﬁts that an investor derives from market participation. First, market
participation enables the investor to share the risk associated with his endowment of
the security. This beneﬁt is captured by the hedging component of investors’ payo s.
Second, market participation enables the investor to buy (resp. sell) the security at
a discount (resp. premium) when other investors are on average net sellers (resp. net
buyers), i.e., when en < 0 (resp. en > 0). This beneﬁt is captured by the speculative
component of investors’ payo s. According to (20) and (21) this component increases
with the pricing error, Var[v pn] because large pricing errors mean that the investor
can buy (resp. sell) the asset at large discount (resp. premium) on average. It also
increases with the precision of the investor’s information, as risk averse investors are
willing to bear more risk when they face less uncertainty on the asset payo .17
The hedging component is identical for insiders and outsiders. In contrast, the
speculative component is higher for insiders since their forecast of the asset payo  is
more precise. Thus, in our model, ticker information is valuable only for speculative
purposes, and not for hedging. Using equations (20) and (21), it is immediate that
C
I
n(µ,l)   C
O
n (µ,l) = ln
 
Var[v|sin,pn l ]
Var[v|sin,pn]
 
= ln
 
  n +  n(µ,l)
  n + ˆ  n(µ,l)
 
> 0. (22)
15If it is not satisﬁed, the expression for investors’ ex-ante expected utility diverges to   .
16They can be obtained from the authors upon request.
17If an investor had a zero endowment in the security with certainty, the hedging component
would be zero and the speculative component would be unchanged.
15We deduce the following result.
Proposition 4 At any date n   2, an insider’s ex-ante expected utility is strictly
larger than an outsider’s expected utility.
Thus, individually, investors beneﬁt from observing the ticker in real-time. How-
ever, the next proposition shows that the regime in which no investor observes the
ticker in real-time always Pareto dominates the regime in which all investors observe
the ticker in real-time.
Proposition 5 At any date n   2, investors’ welfare when the market is fully opaque
(µ = 0) is larger than when the market is fully transparent (µ = 1), i.e., CI
n(1,l) <
CO
n (0,l).
At ﬁrst glance, this result is counterintuitive. Indeed, when µ = 1, investors
have a more precise estimate of the asset payo  than when µ = 0 because past
transaction prices are informative. Hence, they bear less risk, which positively a ects
their expected utility. There are two counterbalancing e ects, however. First, an
increase in the proportion of insiders drives prices “closer” to the payo  of the security
(Proposition 2). This e ect reduces the speculative value of market participation.
Second, an increase in the proportion of insiders implies that each clearing price
becomes more informative for outsiders, as explained in the previous section. Earlier
resolution of uncertainty reduces the scope for risk sharing and thereby the hedging
component of investors’ payo  (formally, Var[v | v   pn] increases in µ). This e ect
corresponds to the so called “Hirshleifer e ect” discussed in Dow and Rahi (2003)
for instance.18 In equilibrium, these two e ects dominate and investors’ welfare is
smaller when µ = 1 than when µ = 0.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
Figure 3 illustrates this result for speciﬁc values of the parameters. For these
values, an investor’s payo  is about 0.41 when µ = 0 and about 0.37 when µ = 1.
18Hirshleifer (1971) point out that disclosure of information can be socially harmful since it
destroys insurance opportunities (one cannot insure against a risk whose realization is known).
Several authors (e.g., Diamond (1985), Marin and Rahi (2000), Dow and Rahi (2003) or Medrano
and Vives (2004)) have observed that a similar e ect prevails when asset prices reveal information on
asset payo s. Early resolution of uncertainty implies that the innovation v   pn is less informative,
i.e., Var[v | v pn] is larger. Thus, the Hirshleifer e ect is measured by Var[v | v pn] in the model.
16However, at µ = 0, an investor could increase her payo  to 0.52 by acquiring ticker
information. Thus, if ticker information is available for free, the situation in which
µ = 0 is not sustainable. In the absence of coordination, each investor uses ticker
information. Eventually, investors end up with a lower expected utility than if they
could commit not to use ticker information at all.
Figure 2 also shows that investors’ payo s decline with the proportion of insiders,
whether they are insiders or outsiders. This result also holds true for all parameter
values as shown in the next proposition.
Proposition 6 At any date n   2 investors’ welfare declines with the proportion of
insiders.
Acquisition of ticker information by one investor exerts a negative externality on
other investors because it reduces the speculative value of market participation and
the scope for risk sharing. Taken together, Proposition 5 and Proposition 6 suggest
that restricting access to ticker information can be socially optimal. To analyze this
point, we use the equally weighted sum of all investors’ payo s, denoted Wn(µ,l), as
a measure of social welfare:
Wn(µ,l)
def
= µC
I
n(µ,l) + (1   µ)C
O
n (µ,l). (23)
We denote by µ 
n, the proportion of insiders that maximizes Wn(µ,l). This proportion
is a Pareto optimum. Indeed, if a proportion µ 
n of investors are insiders, there is no
other distribution of price information among investors arriving at date n that makes
all of them better o  (even if side payments between investors are possible). We
obtain the following result.
Proposition 7 In each period, the proportion of insiders that maximizes investors’
average welfare, µ 
n, is strictly smaller than one.
Proof: We know from Proposition 5 that CI
n(1,l) < CO
n (0,l). Thus, Wn(1,l) <
Wn(0,l). It follows that µ 
n < 1.  
Thus, some degree of opaqueness maximizes investors’ average welfare. Yet, full
opaqueness does not in general maximize investors’ average payo . Indeed, at µ = 0,
the welfare gain of getting price information (CI
n(0,l)   CO
n (0,l)) is large (in fact it
is maximal; see Proposition 8 below). But this welfare gain can be realized only by
allowing some investors to get ticker information.
175.2 The market for price information and welfare
We now endogenize the proportion of insiders by introducing a market for ticker
information in which investors freely decide whether to buy ticker information. We
show that the price set in this market is a tool to implement the socially optimal
proportion of insiders. Moreover, we identify su cient conditions under which a for-
proﬁt exchange prices ticker information in such a way that investors’ average welfare,
Wn(µ,l), is maximized.
At the beginning of each period, before receiving their private signals, investors
decide (i) whether to participate to the market and (ii) whether to purchase ticker in-
formation. We assume that the cost of disseminating information on past transaction
prices does not depend on the proportion of investors buying information. To simplify
notations, we set this cost equal to zero. We denote the price of ticker information
at date n by  n. An investor entering the market at date n becomes an insider if she
pays this fee. Otherwise she is an outsider. We denote the proportion of investors
buying ticker information by µe(l, n).
Let  n(µ,l) be the maximum fee that an investor entering the market at date n
is willing to pay to observe the ticker in real-time. We call this fee the value of the
real-time ticker. Analytically, its expression is given by the di erence between the
payo  of an insider and the payo  of an outsider:
 n(µ,l) = C
I
n(µ,l)   C
O
n (µ,l). (24)
Using equation (22), we obtain
 n(µ,l) =
 
2
ln
 
  n +  n(µ,l)
  n + ˆ  n(µ,l)
 
=
 
2
ln
 
1 +
 n(µ,l)   ˆ  n(µ,l)
  n + ˆ  n(µ,l)
 
> 0. (25)
The value of the real-time ticker at date n is strictly positive because it is more
informative than the “default option,” that is, the truncated ticker ( n > ˆ  n). More-
over, this value increases when the gap between the informativeness of the real-time
ticker and the informativeness of the truncated ticker widens. Proposition 1 implies
that this gap is reduced when the proportion of insiders increases or when latency is
reduced. Thus, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 8 For a ﬁxed latency, the value of the real-time ticker at any date
n   2 decreases with the proportion of insiders. Moreover, for a ﬁxed proportion
of insiders, the value of the real-time ticker weakly increases with the latency in
18information dissemination, l. More precisely:
 n(µ,l) <  n(µ,l + 1) for n > l,
 n(µ,l) =  n(µ,l + 1) for n   l.
At date n, an investor buys ticker information if the price of the ticker is strictly
less than the value of the ticker ( n <  n(µ,l)). She does not buy information if
 n >  n(µ,l). Finally, she is indi erent between buying ticker information or not if
 n =  n(µ,l). Consequently, as the value of the ticker declines with µ, for each price
of the ticker, there is a unique equilibrium proportion of insiders µe(l, n), which is
given by
µ
e(l, n) =
 
 
 
1 if  n    n(1,l),
µ if  n =  n(µ,l),
0 if  n    n(0,l).
(26)
Figure 4 below shows how the equilibrium proportion of insiders is determined. As
 n(µ,l) decreases with µ, the equilibrium proportion of insiders decreases with the
price of ticker information (to see this, consider an upward shift in  10 in Figure 4).
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
The not-for-proﬁt exchange. We now study how market organizers set the price
of ticker information. As a benchmark, we consider the case in which the market
for price information is organized by a not-for proﬁt exchange whose objective is
to maximize investors’ average welfare under a balanced budget constraint. This
exchange can achieve its objective by setting a price:
 
 
n =  n(µ
 
n,l), (27)
for ticker information at date n. Indeed, at this price a fraction µ 
n of investors, which
is precisely the fraction that maximizes investors’ average welfare, decides to buy
price information. The balanced budget constraint is satisﬁed by redistributing the
proceeds from information sale among investors (e.g., by paying a “dividend” to each
investor).19 The (per capita) proceeds from information sales in equilibrium are:
 
NFP
n = µ
 
n 
 
n = µ
 
n n(µ
 
n,l) (28)
19The exchange can cover other costs by charging a ﬁxed entry fee. This fee does not a ect the
decision to buy information or not. See the analysis for the for-proﬁt exchange.
19Thus, outsiders’ net payo  after receiving their “dividend” from the exchange is:
C
O
n (µ
 
n,l) + µ
 
n n(µ
 
n,l) = C
I
n(µ
 
n,l)   (1   µ
 
n) n(µ
 
n,l). (29)
The right-hand side of the previous equation follows from the deﬁnition of  n(µ 
n,l),
and captures insiders’ net payo  since each insider pays a fee  n(µ 
n,l), and receives a
dividend µ 
n n(µ 
n,l). Thus, the price set by the not-for proﬁt exchange is “fair” since
it equalizes insiders and outsiders’ payo s net of the transfers paid to or received from
the exchange.
The for-proﬁt exchange. We now study the case in which the market for price
information is organized by a for-proﬁt exchange.20 The for-proﬁt exchange charges
two fees: a fee for distributing ticker information ( n), and an entry fee (En), which
gives the right to trade. In this way, we account for the fact that exchanges derive
revenues from market participation. We refer to ( n,En) as being the exchange’s
tari . The for-proﬁt exchange chooses its tari  to maximize its proﬁt. Given this
tari , the proportion of insiders is µe(l, n) as explained previously.
As the exchange is a monopolist, it chooses its tari  to extract investors’ surplus.
Thus, the optimal tari  of the exchange is such that21
 
 
n =  n(µ
e(l, 
 
n),l),
E
 
n = C
O
n (µ
e(l, 
 
n),l).
The entry fee is completely determined by the fee for ticker information since this fee
determines the equilibrium proportion of insiders. Hence, the objective function of
the for-proﬁt exchange is
max
  
n
µ
e(l, 
 
n) n(µ
e(l, 
 
n),l) + C
O
n (µ
e(l, 
 
n),l), (30)
As there is a one-to-one relationship between the equilibrium proportion of insiders
and the fee charged for ticker information, the solution of this problem can be found
by ﬁrst solving
max
µ µ n(µ,l) + C
O
n (µ,l). (31)
20Major exchanges (e.g., NYSE-Euronext, Nasdaq, London Stock Exchange, Chicago Mercantile
Exchange) are now for-proﬁt. See Aggarwal and Dahiya (2006) for a survey of exchanges’ governances
around the world.
21In our setting, investors’ payo s do not depend on the proportion of investors entering the mar-
ket. Thus, charging an entry fee larger than outsiders’ payo s cannot be optimal for the exchange.
Indeed, this strategy cannot raise the total revenues obtained from insiders (since these are capped
by insiders’ payo ) and it results in a loss of revenues on outsiders (since they decide to stay put).
20Indeed, if µ  
n is the solution of this optimization problem then  
 
n =  n(µ  
n ,l) is the
optimal price of the ticker at date n for the exchange.
The for-proﬁt exchange faces the following trade-o . On the one hand, by in-
creasing the proportion of insiders, it gets a larger revenue from information sale
(µ n(µ,l)). However, to achieve such an increase, the exchange must lower (i) the
price for ticker information (since   n(µ,l)/ µ < 0) and (ii) the entry fee since
investors’ gain from market participation decreases with the proportion of insiders
( CO
n (µ,l)/ µ < 0). Using the deﬁnition of  n(µ,l), we can rewrite equation (31) as:
max
µ µC
I
n(µ,l) + (1   µ)C
O
n (µ,l) = Wn(µ,l). (32)
The following result is then immediate.
Proposition 9 At any date n   2 and for all values of the parameters, the for-proﬁt
exchange chooses its tari  so that the fraction of investors buying ticker information
maximizes investors’ average welfare (that is, µ  
n = µ 
n). Thus, rationing access to
ticker information is optimal for a for-proﬁt exchange.
Proposition 9 establishes that a two-tier market structure can emerge as a result
of the optimal pricing decisions of a for-proﬁt exchange. Indeed, restricting access to
price information is a way to maintain a high price for the ticker and to increase the
value of market participation. Under our assumptions, it turns out that this two-tier
market structure also maximizes welfare. The for-proﬁt exchange, however, seizes all
the gains from trade with its price structure. Thus, investors prefer the case in which
the proceeds from information sale are redistributed.
[Insert Figure 5 about here]
Figure 5. illustrates Proposition 9 for speciﬁc parameter values (the same as those
in Figure 3 and n = 2). For these parameters, the exchange’s expected proﬁt peaks
at relatively low proportion of insiders (µ  
2   11%).
Latency and the price of ticker information. Previous results are established
for a ﬁxed, arbitrary, level of latency. We now study the e ect of a change in latency
on the price of ticker information and the corresponding proportion of insiders. The
next corollary ﬁrst considers the e ect of an increase in latency on the proportion of
insiders for a ﬁxed price of the ticker.
21Corollary 1 For a ﬁxed price of the ticker at date n,  n, the equilibrium proportion
of insiders at this date weakly increases with latency.
When n > l, other things equal, an increase in latency shifts upwards the value
of the ticker (Proposition 8). Therefore, for a ﬁxed price of the ticker, this increases
the proportion of investors buying information in equilibrium. Figure 4 illustrates
this result. For the parameter values used in Figure 4, an increase in latency from
l = 2 to l = 4 generates an increase in the proportion of insiders from µe   12% to
µe   65%.
The e ect of latency on the proportion of insiders is more complex when we allow
the exchange to react to an increase in latency by adjusting the price of the ticker.
Indeed, as the value of the ticker increases, the exchange has an incentive to raise the
price of the ticker. Thus, the net e ect of a change in latency on the proportion of
insiders is ambiguous when the exchange controls the price of the ticker. However, in
numerical simulations, we always ﬁnd that an increase in latency results in a smaller
proportion of insiders, after accounting for the impact of latency on the fees charged
by the exchange (we have not been able to obtain analytical results in this case).
Discussion. The main point of this section is that a high price for ticker information
(larger than the cost of disseminating information) can be socially desirable. Indeed,
it is a way to curb excessive acquisition of ticker information.
Another ﬁnding is that, under some conditions, a for-proﬁt exchange sets the price
for ticker information that maximizes social welfare. It is worth stressing that these
conditions are unlikely to be satisﬁed in reality for several reasons.
First, we assume that the for-proﬁt exchange can charge di erent fees for investors
arriving at di erent dates. In practice, this form of price discrimination is not ob-
served. Second, in reality, exchanges sell information to investors directly, as in our
model, but also indirectly through data vendors (e.g., Bloomberg or Reuters).22 Ver-
tical relationships between exchanges and data vendors may introduce distortions in
the pricing of ticker information. In particular, data vendors do not earn revenues
from the sale of trading rights. Thus, they have no incentive to internalize, in their
pricing decisions, the e ect of the sale of ticker information on the value of trading
rights. Last, a given security often trades in multiple markets. For such a security,
22 In U.S. equity markets, trades for a given stock can take place in various competing markets.
But revenues from market data are collected by a unique agency. This agency redistributes market
data revenues to the markets generating these revenues according to various rules. Caglio and May-
hew (2008) show empirically that the speciﬁcation of these redistribution schemes a ects exchanges’
pricing policies and investors’ trading strategies.
22transaction prices for trades taking place in di erent markets are close substitutes.23
In this context, the decisions of competing markets regarding the dissemination of
their data are interdependent. Unbridled competition between markets for the same
security could result in a low price for ticker information, leading to excessive dis-
semination of ticker information from a welfare standpoint. For instance, Chi-X is a
trading platform on which investors can trade European blue chips listed on Euronext
and the London Stock Exchange. Chi-X has chosen to disseminate for free informa-
tion on trades and quotes in its system to attract order ﬂow from its competitors. In
contrast, Euronext and the London Stock Exchange charge a fee for this information.
6 Conclusions
In this article, we study the e ect of disseminating information on past transaction
prices in a multi-period rational expectations model. Our model features risk averse
investors who arrive sequentially in the market. Investors entering the market in
a given period have private signals of identical precision but di er in their access
to information on past transaction prices (the ticker). Speciﬁcally, insiders observe
transaction prices in real-time, whereas outsiders observe transaction prices with a
delay (latency). We endogenize the proportion of insiders by introducing a market
for information. Our main ﬁndings are as follows.
1. There is a conﬂict between the private value of ticker information and its social
value. Insiders have a higher expected utility as they have a more precise
forecast of the asset payo . However, acquisition of ticker information by one
investor exerts a negative externality on other investors because it reduces both
the speculative and hedging gains from market participation. Thus, excessive
transparency can be welfare reducing.
2. A market for price information is a mechanism to implement the socially op-
timal level of transparency. A high fee for ticker information (larger than the
information distribution cost) in this market should not necessarily be construed
as a symptom of market ine ciency. In fact, the socially optimal fee is high to
curb excessive acquisition of ticker information.
23They can however contain di erent information and thereby have di erent values. For instance,
Hasbrouck (1995) ﬁnd that the contribution of NYSE prices to price discovery is higher than the
contribution of regional exchanges.
233. The e ects of the dissemination of ticker information on allocative and informa-
tional e ciency are distinct. Indeed, an increase in the proportion of insiders or
a reduction in latency reduces pricing errors and thereby improves price discov-
ery. Thus, in the model, informational e ciency is maximal when all investors
observe the ticker in real-time. This situation, however, does not maximize
investors’ welfare.
The model suggests several directions for future research. For instance, we have
shown that the new information available at a given point in time percolates through
subsequent prices before it becomes known to all investors. It would be interesting
to study more closely this process and its implication for the dynamics of returns
(e.g., their serial correlation). Moreover, the analysis shows that the information
provided on past trades can a ect the level of prices. A more detailed analysis of
this result could relate the cost of capital to the scope of information dissemination
on past trades. Last, as mentioned in the previous section, it would be interesting to
study how competition among exchanges or relationships between data vendors and
exchanges a ect the pricing of ticker information.
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26Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Step 1. Informational content of equilibrium prices.
In a symmetric linear equilibrium, investors’ order placement strategies in period
n   1 can be written as follows:
x
I
n(sin,ein,p
n) = a
I
nsin    
I
n(p
n), (33)
x
O
n(sin,ein,p
n 2,pn) = a
O
nsin    
O
n(p
n l 
,pn), (34)
where  k
n(.) is a linear function of the clearing price at date n and the past prices
observed by an investor with type k   {I,O} ( I
1(.) =  O
1 (.) since price information is
identical for insiders and outsiders at date 1). In any period n, the clearing condition
is   µ
0
x
I
indi +
  1
µ
x
O
indi = en.
Thus, using equations (33) and (34), we deduce that at date n
anv    
I
n(p
n)    
O
n(p
n l 
,pn) = en,  n   2, (35)
with an
def
= µaI
n + (1   µ)aO
n. We deduce that pn is observationally equivalent to
zn = {z1,z2,...,zn} with zn = anv   en.
Step 2. Equilibrium in period n.
Insiders. An insider’s demand function in period n, xI
n(sin,ein,pn), maximizes
E[ exp{ 
 
(v   pn)x
I
n + pnein
 
/ }|sin,ein,p
n].
We deduce that
x
I
n(sin,ein,p
n) =  
E[v   pn|sin,ein,pn]
Var[v   pn|sin,ein,pn]
=  
E[v|sin,ein,pn]   pn
Var[v|sin,ein,pn]
.
As pn is observationally equivalent to zn, we deduce (using well-known properties of
normal random variables)
E[v|sin,ein,p
n] = E[v|sin,ein,z
n] = ( n(µ,l) +   n)
 1( nE[v|z
n] +   nsin),
Var[v|sin,ein,p
n] = Var[v|sin,ein,z
n] = ( n(µ,l) +   n)
 1,
where
 n(µ,l)
def
= (Var[v|p
n])
 1 = (Var[v|z
n])
 1 =  v +  e
n  
t=1
a
2
t. (36)
27Thus,
x
I
n(sin,ein,p
n) =  ( n +   n)(E[v|sin,ein,p
n]   pn)
= a
I
n(sin   pn) +   n(E[v|p
n]   pn), (37)
where aI
n =    n.
Outsiders. An outsider’s demand function in period n, xO
n(sin,ein,pn l ,pn), maxi-
mizes:
E
 
 exp
 
 
 
(v   pn)x
O
in + pnein
 
/ 
 
|sin,ein,p
n l 
,pn
 
.
We deduce that
x
O
n(sin,ein,p
n 2,pn) =  
E[v   pn|sin,pn l ,pn]
Var[v   pn|sin,ein,pn l ,pn]
=  
E[v|sin,ein,pn l ,pn]   pn
Var[v   pn|sin,ein,pn l ,pn]
.
In equilibrium, outsiders correctly anticipate that the clearing price at each date is
given by
pn = Anv  
l  1  
j=0
Bn,jen j + DnE[v | p
n l 
], for n   1. (38)
Let ˆ zn be the signal on v that an outsider can obtain from the equilibrium price pn,
given that he observes pn l . Using equation (38), we obtain that
ˆ zn =
pn   DnE[v | pn l ]
An
= v  
l  1  
j=0
Bn,j
An
en j (39)
=
l  1  
j=0
 jzn j, (40)
with
 0 = (1 + µ  e)(an(1 + µ  e) + µ  e(
l  1  
j=1
an j))
 1,
and
 j = (µ  e)(an(1 + µ  e) + µ  e(
l  1  
j=1
an j))
 1.
Thus, {sin,pn l ,pn} is observationally equivalent to {sin,pn l , ˆ zn}. Moreover, equa-
tion (39) implies
ˆ zn|v   N
 
v,A
 2
n
 
l  1  
j=0
B
2
n,j
 
 
 1
e
 
.
28Let  
def
= A2
n(
 l  1
j=0 B2
n,j) 1. Using well known properties of normal random variables,
we obtain
E[v|sin,ein,p
n l 
,pn] = (ˆ  n(µ,l) +   n)
 1(ˆ  n(µ,l)E[v|p
n l 
,pn] +   nsin),
Var[v|sin,ein,p
n l 
,pn] = (ˆ  n(µ,l) +   n)
 1 ,
where
ˆ  n(µ,l)
def
= (Var[v|p
n l 
,pn])
 1 = (Var[v|z
n l 
, ˆ zn])
 1 =  n l (µ,l) +   e. (41)
In the rest of the proofs, we sometimes omit arguments µ and l in ˆ  n(µ,l) and  n(µ,l)
for brevity. Thus,
x
O
n(sin,ein,p
n l 
,pn) =   (ˆ  n +   n)(E[v|sin,p
n l 
,pn]   pn)
= a
O
n(sin   pn) +  ˆ  n(E[v|p
n l 
,pn]   pn). (42)
with aO
n = aI
n =    n.
Clearing price in period n. The clearing condition in period n imposes
  µ
0
x
I
indi +
  1
µ
x
O
indi = en.
Using equations (37) and (42), we solve for the equilibrium price and we obtain
pn =
1
Kn
 
zn + µ  nE[v|p
n] + (1   µ) ˆ  nE[v|p
n l 
,pn]
 
, (43)
where
Kn = an +  (µ n + (1   µ)ˆ  n), (44)
with an = µaI
n + (1   µ)aO
n =    n. Observe that
E[v|p
n l 
,pn] = E[v|p
n l 
, ˆ zn] = ˆ  
 1
n
 
 n l E[v|p
n l 
] +   eˆ zn
 
,
E[v|p
n] = E[v|p
n l 
,zn 1,zn] =  
 1
n ( n l E[v|p
n l 
] +  e
n  
t=n (l  1)
atzt).
Substituting E[v|pn l ,pn] and E[v|pn] by these expressions in equation (43), we can
express pn as a function of v, {en j}
l  1
j=0 , and E[v|pn l ]. In equilibrium, the coe -
cients on these variables must be identical to those in equation (38). This condition
29imposes
An =
(an + µ  e
 n
t=n (l  1) a2
t) + (1   µ)   e
Kn
, (45)
Bn,0 =
1 + µ an e + (1   µ)  e Bn,0A 1
n
Kn
, (46)
Bn,j =
µ an j e + (1   µ)  e Bn,jA 1
n
Kn
,  j   {1,...,l
    1}, (47)
Dn =
  n l 
Kn
. (48)
Equations (45), (46), (47) form a system with l  +1 unknowns: An and {Bn,j}
j=l  1
j=0 .
Solving this system of equations, we obtain
An =
an + µ ( n    n l )
Kn
 
1 +
(1   µ)  e(an + µ ( n    n l ))
(1 + µ an e)2 +
 l  1
j=1 (µ an j e)2
 
, (49)
Bn,0 =
An(1 + µ an e)
an + µ ( n    n l )
, (50)
Bn,j =
An(µ an j e)
an + µ ( n    n l )
, for 1   j   l
    1, (51)
Dn =
  n l 
Kn
. (52)
We deduce from these expressions and equation (41) that
ˆ  n(µ,l) =  n l  +
(an + µ ( n    n l ))2
(1 + µ an e)2 +
 l  1
j=1 (µ an j e)2 e. (53)
This achieves the characterization of the equilibrium in each period in closed-form.
QED
Proof of Proposition 1
Part 1. We have shown in the proof of Lemma 1 that
 n(µ,l) =  v +  e
n  
t=1
a
2
t.
where at =    t (see equation (36)). As at does not depend on µ and l, it is immediate
that  n does not depend on these parameters.
Part 2. From equation (53) in the proof of Lemma 1, we deduce that
ˆ  n(µ,l) =  n l  +  
m
n (µ,l), (54)
30with
 
m
n (µ,l)
def
=
(an + µ ( n    n l ))2
(1 + µ an e)2 +
 l  1
j=1 (µ an j e)2 e. (55)
As
  m
n (µ,l)
 µ
=
2  e( n 1    n l )(an(1 +  µ ean) + µ ( n 1    n l ))
((1 +  µ ean)2 + (µ )2 e( n 1    n l ))2 > 0,
we deduce that ˆ  n(µ,l) increases with µ.
We now show that ˆ  n(µ,l) decreases in l. Using equation (53), we have that
ˆ  n(µ,l) = ˆ  n(µ,l + 1), for n   l. For n > l, we deduce from equation (53) that
ˆ  n(µ,l)   ˆ  n(µ,l + 1) =
 
a
2
n l +
G2
n(µ,l)
Qn(µ,l)
 
G2
n(µ,l + 1)
Qn(µ,l + 1)
 
 e (56)
=
 
a2
n l(1 + µ  ean)2
Qn(µ,l)Qn(µ,l + 1)
 
 e,
where Qn(µ,l)
def
= (1+µ  e)2+
 l 1
j=1(µ an j e)2 and Gn(µ,l)
def
= an+
 l 1
j=0(µ  e)a2
n j.
We therefore have that ˆ  n(µ,l) > ˆ  n(µ,l + 1) for n > l.
Last, ˆ  n(µ,l) can be written as follows
ˆ  n(µ,l) =  n l  +  e
 
(
 l  1
j=0  n jan j)2
 l  1
j=0  2
n j
 
,
with  n = (1 + µ an e) and  n j = (µ an j e) for j   1. It is then direct to show
that ˆ  n <  n since an j > 0. QED
Proof of Proposition 2
As v and pn are normally distributed for all n, we have
Var[v   pn] = Var[v   pn | p
n l 
] + Var
 
E
 
v   pn | p
n l   
.
Using the expression of the clearing price given in Lemma 1, we obtain
E
 
v   pn | p
n l  
= E
 
v | p
n l  
  (An + Dn)E
 
v | p
n l  
.
Now, equations (45), (48) and the deﬁnition of Kn in the proof of Lemma 1 yields
An =
(an + µ  e
 n
t=n (l  1) a2
t) + (1   µ) (ˆ  n    n l )
Kn
=
Kn   KnDn
Kn
= 1   Dn.
31Thus, An + Dn = 1. We deduce that
E
 
v   pn | p
n l  
= 0, (57)
which yields
Var[v   pn] = Var
 
v   pn | p
n l  
= (1   An)
2 
 1
n l  +
 
l  1  
j=0
B
2
n,j
 
 
 1
e
= (1   An)
2 
 1
n l  + A
2
n(ˆ  n    n l )
 1, (58)
where the last equation follows from equation (41) in the proof of Lemma 1. We
can now di erentiate the R.H.S of equation (58) with respect to µ to show that
Var[v   pn] decreases with µ. We omit details of the calculations for brevity. They
can be obtained upon request. QED
Proof of Proposition 3
Using the expressions for An and Bn,0 in the proof of Lemma 1, we obtain that
Bn,0(l) =
 
         
         
(1+µ an e)
an+ (µ n+(1 µ)ˆ  n)
 
1 +
(1 µ)  e(an+µ ( n  v))
(1+µ an e)2+
Pn 1
j=1 (µ an j e)2
 
, for n   l,
(1+µ an e)
an+ (µ n+(1 µ)ˆ  n)
 
1 +
(1 µ)  e(an+µ ( n  n l))
(1+µ an e)2+
Pl 1
j=1(µ an j e)2
 
, for n > l.
For n   l, ˆ  n does not depend on l (see equation (54)). Thus, Bn,0(l) = Bn,0(l + 1).
For n > l, we have
Bn,0(l) =
(1 + µ a e)
a +  (µ n + (1   µ)ˆ  n)
 
1 +
(1   µ)  eGn(µ,l)
Qn(µ,l)
 
,
where Gn(µ,l) and Qn(µ,l) are deﬁned in the proof of Proposition 1. Calculations
show that
Gn(µ,l)
Qn(µ,l)
>
Gn(µ,l + 1)
Qn(µ,l + 1)
.
This inequality combined with the fact that ˆ  n decreases with latency for n > l
implies that Bn,0(l) < Bn,0(l + 1). To sum up:
Bn,0(l) < Bn,0(l + 1), for n > l,
Bn,0(l) = Bn,0(l + 1), for n   l.
32Proposition 3 follows from equation (19). QED
Proof of Proposition 4
Immediate from the arguments in the text. QED
Proof of Proposition 5
We prove that CI
n(1,l) < CO
n (0,l). To this end, we deﬁne Sk
n(µ,l) and Hn(µ,l) such
that:
S
k
n(µ,l) = ln
 
Var[v   pn]
Var[v|sin,pn]
 
, (59)
Hn(µ,l) = ln
 
 e     2Var[v | v   pn]
 e
 
. (60)
That is, Sk
n(µ,l) and Hn(µ,l) are respectively the speculative component and the
hedging component of the payo  for an investor with type k. Clearly if (i) SI
n(1,l) <
SO
n (0,l) and (ii) Hn(1,l) < Hn(0,l) then CI
n(1,l) < CO
n (0,l). We prove that these
two conditions hold true.
First, consider SI
n(µ,l). Using equation (58) in the proof of Proposition 2 and the
expressions for the coe cients An and Bn,j in the proof of Lemma 1, we obtain after
some algebra
S
I
n(1,l) = ln
 
 2 n l  +   1
e ((1 +  an e)2 +
 l  1
j=1 ( an j e)2)
 2(  n +  n(1,l))3/2
 
,
S
O
n (0,l) = ln
 
 2 n l  +   1
e (1 +  an e)2
 2(  n +    n(0,l))3/2
 
.
Observe that SI
n(1,l) = SO
n (0,l) i    n j = 0,  j   {1,...,l    1} since in this case
an j = 0,  j   {1,...,l    1} and  n(1,l) =    n(0,l). Now, it is easily checked
that SI
n(1,l) decreases in an j, for j   {1,...,l    1}. This implies that it decreases
with   n j since an j =    n j. Moreover, SI
n(0,l) does not depend on an j,  j  
{1,...,l    1}. As   n j > 0, we deduce that SI
n(1,l) < SO
n (0,l).
Now, consider Hn(µ,l). As v and v   pn are normally distributed:
Var[v | v   pn] = Var[v]  
Cov
2[v,v   pn]
Var[v   pn]
. (61)
Moreover, we have
Cov[v,v   pn] = E [Cov[v,v   pn |  n l ]] + Cov[E [v |  n l ],E [v   pn |  n l ]],
(62)
33where  n l  = pn l . We have E[v   pn |  n l ] = 0 (see equation (2) in the proof of
Proposition 2). Thus, using the expression for the equilibrium price:
Cov[v,v   pn] = Cov[v,v   pn |  n l ] = Dn 
 1
n l .
Hence, using (61) and the expression for Dn, we deduce that
Var[v | v   pn] =  
 1
v  
 2
K2
nVar[v   pn]
. (63)
Using the deﬁnition of Kn and equation (58) in the proof of Proposition 2, we obtain
that
K
2
nVar[v   pn] =
 
 2 n l  +   1
e (1 +  an e)2, if µ = 0,
 2 n l  +   1
e ((1 +  an e)2 +
 j=l  1
j=1 ( an j e)2), if µ = 1.
It is then immediate, using equations (60) and (63) that Hn(1,l) < Hn(0,l).
QED
Proof of Proposition 6
Observe that:
C
k
n(µ,l) =
 
2
 
ln
  
Var[v   pn]
Var[v| k
n]
  
 2 e   Var[v | v   pn]
 2 e   Var[v]
   
=
 
2
 
ln
  
Var[v   pn]
Var[v| k
n]
  
1 +
 
1
 2 e   Var[v]
  
 2
K2
nVar[v   pn]
    
where the second equality follows from equation (63) in the proof of Proposition 5.
Thus,
C
k
n(µ,l) =
 
2
 
ln
 
Var[v   pn]
Var[v| k
n]
+
 
1
 2 e   Var[v]
  
 2
K2
nVar[v| k
n]
   
(64)
Consider insiders ﬁrst (CI
n(µ,l)). For insiders, Var[v| I
n] does not depend on µ since
 n does not depend on µ. Using equation (44) in the proof of Lemma 1, it is immediate
that Kn increases with µ. Next, we know from Proposition 2 that Var[v pn] decreases
with µ. We deduce from these observations and equation (64) that
 CI
n(µ,l)
 µ
> 0.
For outsiders, the argument is more complex because Var[v| O
n] decrease with µ (the
precision of outsiders’ forecasts improves when the proportion of insiders enlarges).
However, calculations show that
 CO
n (µ,l)
 µ
> 0.
34We omit these calculations for brevity. They can be obtained upon request. QED
Proof of Proposition 8
Immediate from the arguments in the text. QED
Proof of Proposition 9
Immediate from the arguments in the text. QED
Proof of Corollary 1
Immediate from the arguments in the text. QED
35Figure 1: The timeline
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35Figure 2: Variance of the pricing error Var[v pn] as a function of latency. Parameter
values:  v = 2,  e = 1,   n = 1, for n = 1,2,...,N,   = 1, µ = 0.01, N = 50, and
l   {10,20,30,40,50}.
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37Figure 3: Speculators’ welfare is higher in a fully opaque market (µ = 0) compared
to a fully transparent one (µ = 1): CO
2 (0,2) > CI
2(1,2). Parameters’ values:  v = 2,
 e = 1,   1 =   2 = 1,   = 1, and n = 2.
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39Figure 4: Value of the ticker for two levels of latency when n > l. Parameters’ values:
 v = 2,  e = 1,   = 1, l   {2,4}, and   n = 1 for n = 1,2,...,50.
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38Figure 5: Proﬁt from ticker sale and entry fee: The Exchange optimally segments the
market (µ    0.11). Parameters’ values:  v = 2,  e = 1,   1 =   2 = 1,   = 1, and
n = 2.
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